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I. INTRODUCTION
In Summer 2010, Mustafa Willis-24 years old at the time-
was arrested walking down the street in Newark, New Jersey.
Suddenly, police officers swarmed Willis. They had found a
gun at the scene and placed Willis under arrest for unlawful
possession of a firearm. Once Willis was taken to jail, however,
he was unable to post his five thousand ollar bail. As a result,
he was unable to return to work and to his family. He was un-
able to gather evidence to support his defense that the gun was
not his. Willis was faced with a choice: wait in jail until his
trial, or plead guilty to a crime he did not commit. Willis re-
fused to plead guilty to a crime he did not commit, and as a
result he lost his job and missed his cousin's funeral. After a
few months, the court reduced Willis's bail to three thousand
dollars, and he was able to post bail. Willis was then able to
find a video that proved the gun did not belong to him. Prose-
cutors then dismissed the charges. Willis was not completely
unimpacted, however-he had spent three months in jail, he
owed his bail bondsman three thousand dollars, he lost time
with his family, and lost his job. Bail-the criminal justice
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scheme designed to protect defendants who have yet to be con-
victed of any crime from being detained pre-trial-was precisely
what kept Willis in jail.1
Mustafa Willis's story illustrates the impact of this country's cur-
rent reliance on a primarily monetary bail system. The injustice
suffered by Willis illustrates how a bail system, while well inten-
tioned, can have adverse consequences for some defendants. These
consequences raise questions. How effective is a monetary bail sys-
tem? If the system is truly ineffective, and the problems outweigh
the benefits of the current system, what changes can be made to the
pre-trial detention system? Does an entirely new pre-trial deten-
tion system need to be designed and implemented?
This article explores the problems associated with Pennsylva-
nia's current monetary bail system. The various problems associ-
ated with a monetary bail system merit attention, and this article
therefore proposes a solution that will combat these problems. Part
II provides an overview of the history and purpose of bail in our
criminal justice system. Part III describes Pennsylvania's current
monetary bail system in detail and provides data that reveal Penn-
sylvania's overreliance on monetary bail conditions.
Practical problems associated with a monetary bail system are
explained in Part IV, which reviews the negative impacts of mone-
tary bail on the accused, how the bail system undermines its own
purpose of ensuring appearance in court, and the long-term impacts
that the bail system has on the criminal justice system as a whole.
Additionally, Part IV examines how courts have exposed and ad-
dressed problems associated with a bail system, the importance of
protecting an individual's liberty, and the importance of monetary
bail alternatives-particularly for indigent defendants. The exist-
ing literature, reviewed in Part IV, calls for reform to the current
bail systems. Reform must be individualized by jurisdiction, and
Part IV reviews the empirical data that reveal how Pennsylvania's
current monetary bail system causes the practical problems and im-
pacts defendants and the criminal justice system as a whole.
Part V outlines different jurisdictions' responses to a monetary
bail system that focus on pre-trial release, community safety, and
ensuring appearance. Part V's review of other jurisdictions' solu-
tions establishes the foundation for proposing reform in Pennsylva-
nia. Part VI then describes the efforts that Pennsylvania has taken
to address some of its bail problems with the implementation of
1. Planet Money: New Jersey Bails Out, NPR (July 12, 2017) (downloaded using iTunes).
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risk-assessment tools. Part VII argues that while these reforms are
certainly steps in the right direction, empirical data in Pennsylva-
nia reveal that risk-assessment tools alone are insufficient and that
radical change is needed. Finally, Part VIII proposes that Pennsyl-
vania should combine an amendment o the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution with non-monetary bail legislation.
II. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE BAIL SYSTEM
A bail system is deeply rooted in the criminal procedures of both
federal and state judiciaries. Bail controls the pre-trial detention
procedures of defendants who have been charged, but not yet con-
victed, of a crime in every state.2 Bail is seen as a compromise be-
tween the criminal justice system and its defendants.3 Its purpose
is two-fold. 4 First, bail ensures that defendants will appear in court
for their trial.5 Second, bail detains those who the court considers
dangerous, thereby protecting public safety.6 Bail is also designed
to protect the rights of defendants who have not yet been convicted
of a crime by avoiding premature punishments, thus maintaining
the presumption of "innocent until proven guilty."7
A bail system is also rooted in the United States Constitution.
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.'8 This amendment is
incorporated into the bail system to protect defendants from unwar-
ranted pre-trial detention prior to conviction.9 Although there is no
guarantee of bail,10 courts have held that bail is "excessive" when it
is "set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to
fulfill this purpose," and fixing an unreasonably high bail amount
to practically deny bail violates the Eighth Amendment. The
2. Id.
3. Id.





7. Planet Money, supra note 1.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
9. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (observing that "[t]his traditional right to
freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to
prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction").
10. See generally United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 753 (1987).
11. Stack, 342 U.S. at 5.
418 Vol. 57
PA's Monetary Bail System
guarantee that bail not be excessive, however, is arbitrary in a mon-
etary bail system,12 because even bail that is not excessive-not un-
reasonably high to fulfill its purpose-can effectively deny a partic-
ular defendant pre-trial release, regardless of the amount.
Bail originates at common law; the accused could be released
prior to trial based on the good word of the accused's relatives in
addition to collateral.13 The United States continues to rely primar-
ily on a cash bail system.14 Jurisdictions differ on how to set bail
amounts: some set bail amounts based on the charges alone,15 while
others consider a variety of circumstantial factors (sometimes in-
cluding a defendant's financial situation) to determine a bail dollar
amount.16 Still others employ risk-based assessment tools that use
objective factors in determining whether a defendant should be de-
tained pre-trial.17 Regardless of the divergence among jurisdic-
tions, the majority of states rely on monetary conditions of release.18
Pennsylvania is indicative of this type of bail system.
I1. PENNSYLVANIA'S CURRENT MONETARY BAIL SYSTEM
Pennsylvania, like many other states, relies on a monetary bail
system as a means of achieving the compromise between protecting
the accused and ensuring public safety and trial appearance. Bail
is defined as "the security or other guarantee required and given for
the release of a person, conditioned upon a written undertaking, in
the form of a bail bond, that the person will appear when required
and comply with all conditions set forth in the bail bond."19 After
an individual is arrested, magisterial district judges determine
whether that individual is eligible for release pending trial.20 In
murder or voluntary manslaughter cases, a court of common pleas
judge makes bail decisions.21 In Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, the
Philadelphia Municipal Court and the Pittsburgh Magistrate
Court, respectively, set and accept bail regardless of the underlying
crime.22 The Pennsylvania State Constitution provides that "[a]ll
12. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, MOVING BEYOND
MONEY: A PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM 4 (2016).
13. Liana M. Goff, Note, Pricing Justice: The Wasteful Enterprise ofAmerica's Bail Sys-
tem, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 881, 888-89 (2017).
14. Id. at 890.
15. Id. at 891.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 885.
18. Id. at 891-92.
19. PA. R. CRIM. P. 103.
20. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1515(a)(4) (2017).
21. Id.
22. Id. §§ 1123(a)(5), 1143(a)(1).
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prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties" and lists two ex-
ceptions: (1) capital offenses for which the maximum sentence is life
imprisonment, and (2) if no condition other than imprisonment will
assure the safety to the community.23 This language is also re-
flected in the Pennsylvania Code in its "Right to bail" statute.
24
If the defendant falls within one of these exceptions, a magisterial
district judge may deem the defendant non-bailable.25 A judge may
also deny bail if there is sufficient proof to believe that the defend-
ant will not show up for trial regardless of the amount of bail.26 The
non-bailable defendant is then detained in jail to await trial.
27 If
the defendant does not fall within one of these exceptions, the de-
fendant has a right to bail and is considered bailable.28 There are
several routes a magisterial district judge may employ once he or
she considers a defendant bailable.29 First, the judge may decide to
release the defendant on his or her own recognizance, or on a per-
sonal promise by a defendant to appear for trial.30 A second option
is to release the defendant on nominal bail, where the defendant
must pay a nominal amount of cash, typically one dollar, and the
defendant is released based on a designated person or organiza-
tion's promise that the defendant will appear for trial.3 1 Third, the
judge may also decide to release the defendant with non-monetary
conditions, such as pre-trial supervision or special rehabilitative
programs.3 2 Finally, the judge may decide to release a defendant
by setting a monetary condition of release.33
In determining monetary conditions of release, magisterial dis-
trict judges exercise discretion.34 When setting bail amounts,
judges must consider the financial ability of the defendant, as well
as factors that are relevant to a defendant's likelihood of appear-
ance at trial, including: the nature of the offense; record of flight to
avoid prosecution; and the defendant's employment status, family
23. PA. CONST. art. I, § 14; 6 P.L.E. Bail § 1 (2017).
24. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5701 (2017).
25. PA. R. CRIM. P. 520; CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 12, at 5.
26. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 12, at 5.
27. 6 P.L.E. Bail § 1 (2017).
28. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5701.
29. PA. R. CRIM. P. 524(C).
30. PA. R. CRIM. P. 524(C)(1); CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 12, at 5-6.
31. PA. R. CRIM. P. 524(C)(4).
32. Id. at R. 524(C)(2), 527 (nonmonetary conditions of release include reporting require-
ments, restrictions on travel, or any other appropriate conditions to ensure appearance);
CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 12, at 6.
33. PA. R. CRIM. P. 524(C)(5). Judges may also release a defendant on an unsecured bail
bond, which requires no money be deposited upon release but does impose monetary penal-
ties if the defendant fails to appear. Id. at R. 524(C)(3).
34. Commonwealth v. Miller, 160 A. 240, 240 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932).
420 Vol. 57
PA's Monetary Bail System
relationships, length of time in the community, age, mental condi-
tion, reputation, addictions, previous appearances, criminal his-
tory, or use of false identification.3 5 The statute does not give
weight to any particular factor nor does it require all of these factors
be considered-that decision is at the descrection of the magisterial
district judge.36 Notably, pre-trial risk-assessment tools3 7 may also
be considered as a factor in reaching a bail determination, but may
not be the only means.
38
Monetary bonds may be secured or unsecured.3 9 Unsecured
bonds specify an amount of money owed to the court if the defend-
ant fails to appear for their court date, but no money is required for
release.40 Secured bonds also specify an amount of money owed to
the court if the defendant fails to appear for his court date, but re-
quire no more than ten percent of that amount be posted before the
defendant is released.41 If a defendant needs help posting his or her
bond, he or she may seek help from friends, family members, or or-
ganizations.4 2 Other defendants seek help from a bail bondsman,
who will post the defendant's bail and require that the defendant
pay the bondsman back, with a fee.43 In these scenarios, the friends
and family members or the bondsman are accepting the risk if the
defendant fails to appear in court.44 If the defendant cannot afford
to post bond, they will remain detained pre-trial.4 5
Despite the ABA's requirement that monetary bail conditions
should be imposed only when there is no other way to ensure a de-
fendant's subsequent appearances,46 monetary bail is imposed more
often than the other options.4 7 For example, in 2014, the court im-
posed monetary conditions of release on over half of Allegheny
County arrestees.48 Monetary bail conditions were imposed on sev-
enty-nine percent of defendants charged with a felony and one-third
35. PA. R. CRIM. P. 528(A)(1)-(2), 523(A)(1)-(10).
36. See id. at R. 523(A)(1)-(10).
37. See, e.g., infra note 193 and accompanying text.
38. PA. R. CRIM. P. 523 cmt.
39. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 12, at 6.
40. Id.; PA. R. CRIM. P. 524(C)(3).
41. PA. R. CRIM. P. 524(C)(5), 528(C); CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 12,
at 6.
42. Wiltz, supra note 4.
43. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5741 (2017).
44. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 12, at 6.
45. Id.
46. AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: PRETRIAL RELEASE 3 (3d ed.
2007).
47. MARK A. NORDENBURG & FREDERICK W. THIEMAN, UNIV. OF PITTSBURGH INST. OF





of defendants charged with a misdemeanor.49 Therefore, although
judges have several options within Pennsylvania's bail statutes to
determine pre-trial release criteria, the system is predominately
monetary.
IV. PROBLEMS AND CRITICISMS OF A MONETARY BAIL
SYSTEM
Pennsylvania's current monetary bail system relies on "wealth
based" pre-trial detention.50 For indigent individuals who are una-
ble to post their bonds, the bail system, which is designed to protect
defendants from unnecessary pre-trial detention, is precisely what
keeps these individuals in jail. 51 Despite the presumption of our
criminal justice system-innocent until proven guilty-throughout
the country there are 450,000 legally innocent individuals in jail
awaiting trial simply because they cannot afford to post their mon-
etary bail.52 Three-fifths of jail populations are defendants await-
ing trial or plea resolution because they cannot afford even a low
bail.53 The problems with the monetary bail system go beyond in-
justice. The system undermines its own purpose and also has
broader implications on our criminal justice system. Part A of this
section will discuss the practical problems and the impact of those
problems on the accused. Part B of this section will discuss how
courts have addressed the problems with a monetary bail system.
Part C of this section will review the existing literature commenting
on both the problems of a monetary bail system and proposed solu-
tions. Finally, Part D of this section will discuss how empirical
studies have revealed the problems with Pennsylvania's monetary
bail system.
A. Practical Problems and the Impact of a Monetary Bail System
i. Monetary Bail Fails to Ensure Appearance in Court
'Bail is supposed to make sure that you show up for court. How
much money you have in your pocket shouldn't determine that."
49. Id.
50. Challenging the Money Bail System, CIV. RTS. CORPS, http://www.civil-
rightscorps.org/work/wealth-based-detention (last visited Feb. 1, 2019).
51. Planet Money, supra note 1.
52. Challenging the Money Bail System, supra note 50.
53. Sarah Lazare, Hundreds of Thousands Are Languishing in Jails Because They Can't
Afford Bail Bonds: A National Movement is Building to End This, JUST. POL'Y INST. (Dec. 22,
2016), http ://www.justicepolicy.org/news/I 1103.
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- Leslie Cooper, Washington DC's Pre-trial Services Agency
Deputy Director
54
As mentioned earlier, the first purpose of bail in our criminal jus-
tice system is to ensure a defendant appears in court for trial.55 Eric
Sterling, Executive Director of the Criminal Justice Policy Founda-
tion, confirms that there is a growing recognition that a monetary
bail system does not necessarily ensure that defendants will appear
in court. 56 Under the logic of the current system, a high bond should
increase the chances that a defendant appears for trial as to not
forfeit the money. Yet, results of the Pre-trial Justice Institute's
study on unsecured bond show that a higher bail amount does not
correlate with an increase in court appearances.57 Additionally, re-
sults of a 2016 study entitled The Heavy Costs of High Bail analyzed
the consequences of a money bail system in Philadelphia and Pitts-
burgh, the two largest cities in Pennsylvania, revealing that mone-
tary bail has a negligible effect on appearance rates, if not increas-
ing defendants' failures to appear.58 In fact, individuals released on
recognizance appear at the same rate as those with monetary bail
conditions.
59
ii. Monetary Bail Increases Recidivism and Creates an Illu-
sion of Public Safety
The second purpose of bail in our criminal justice system is to
ensure the safety for the public.60 Under the logic of the current
system, bail protects the public by keeping those accused of crimes
from committing a new crime while awaiting trial, and this consid-
eration must indeed be contemplated pursuant to Pennsylvania's
"Right to bail" statute.6 1 With a monetary bail system, however,
money is the only factor separating pre-trial detainees from re-
lease.6 2 Yet the amount of money in a defendant's pocket certainly
54. Wiltz, supra note 4.
55. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
56. Wiltz, supra note 4.
57. MICHAEL R. JONES, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., UNSECURED BONDS: THE AS EFFECTIVE
AND MOST EFFICIENT PRETRIAL RELEASE OPTION 14 (2013).
58. Arpit Gupta et al., The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomiza-
tion, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 471, 472, 496 (2016).
59. JONES, supra note 57, at 22.
60. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
61. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5701 (an individual is not bailable if "no condition or com-
bination of conditions other than imprisonment will reasonably assure the safety of any per-
son and the community").
62. See generally PA. R. CRIM. P. 524(C)(5).
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does not predict re-offense.6 3 In fact, incarceration alone makes it
more likely that an individual will commit another crime.6 4 Defend-
ants who are incarcerated before trial have higher rates of recidi-
vism than those who were free awaiting trial.6 5 When compared to
similar offenders released before trial, low-risk offenders held
longer than three days are fifty percent more likely to be re-arrested
within two years.66 According to the Arnold Foundation, an organ-
ization whose objective is to promote a fair criminal justice system,
when a low-risk individual is incarcerated, even for less than
twenty-four hours, he or she is more likely to commit a crime after
that experience.6 7 A Pennsylvania House Representative agrees
that antiquated bail practices have provided no proof of keeping the
public safe.6
8
Furthermore, the nature of corrections fails low-risk individuals
who have yet to be convicted of any crime.6 9 Incarceration before
trial may increase the chances of an individual's involvement with
crime after release.70 The default corrections route within our crim-
inal justice system is institutionalization.71 Yet, according to John
Wetzel, Secretary of Corrections for the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania, it is the least effective option.72 He confirms that "with low
risk individuals, [the Department of Corrections] do[es] very badly.
They're going to come out worse almost across the board."73 When
the criminal justice system forces those who will be better served
outside of the criminal justice system into institutionalization
based solely on their financial situation, it both fails the individual
and undermines its purpose.
63. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 12, at 6.
64. Criminal Injustice: Correcting a Corrections Department, WESA (Sept. 19, 2017)
(downloaded using iTunes).
65. Erika Eichelberger, Study: Pretrial Detention Creates More Crime, MOTHER JONES
(Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2013/12/pretrial-detention-re-
peat-offenders/.
66. Jeffery Fraser, No Money Down: Bail Reform Seeks to Cut Incarceration Rates, PITT.
Q. (2017), https://pittsburghquarterly.com/pq-commerce/pq-region/item/1454-no-money-do
wn.html.
67. Criminal Injustice: Correcting a Corrections Department, supra note 64.
68. Memorandum from Representative Joanna E. McClinton to House of Representa-
tives (Jan. 30, 2017, 2:13 PM), http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/Legis/CSM/showMemo
Public.cfm?chamber=H&SPick=20170&cosponld=22597 [hereinafter Memo on H.B. 1092].
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iii. Monetary Bail has Negative Economic Impacts on Al-
ready Indigent Defendants
"The truth of the matter is a day in jail is too long if you don't
need to be there. The consequences of being removed from your
job, your home, your car, your family when you shouldn't be has
aprofound impact on that person, the jail population-everyone
pays.
- Elliot Howsie, Allegheny County Chief Public Defender74
Spending time in jail awaiting trial perpetuates the cycle of pov-
erty for indigent defendants. When a defendant is bailable but
must stay in jail awaiting trial, it is likely that he or she cannot
afford to pay for release.7 5 Because he or she is not released pre-
trial, the individual may lose their job, their housing, or their gov-
ernment assistance while waiting in jail.76 The defendant's lack of
money-the very reason they remained in jail in the first place-is
now made worse because he or she was awaiting trial in jail. In-
deed, Jeanne Pearlman, Senior Vice President for Program and Pol-
icy at the Pittsburgh Foundation, confirms that "the system perpet-
uating the conditions that keep people in poverty ... incarceration
... is a cause of poverty and it is an effect of poverty at the same
time. '77 These circumstances can also have an impact on a defend-
ant's child custody determination and access to health care.78 Fur-
thermore, when a defendant is no longer able to support his or her
family while incarcerated, it puts an economic and emotional strain
on the family.7 9 This may create a need for families to enroll in
social welfare programs until the defendant is afforded a trial.
80
iv. Monetary Bail Contributes to Our Country's Mass Incar-
ceration Epidemic
Despite accounting for less than five percent of the world's popu-
lation, the United States houses twenty-five percent of the world's
prisoners.81 The United States incarcerates 693 people for every
100,000 residents, which is higher than any other country in the
74. Fraser, supra note 66.
75. All Things Considered: In New Jersey, Sweeping Reforms Deliver Existential Threat
to Bail Bonds Industry, NPR (July 6, 2017, 4:31 PM) (downloaded using iTunes).
76. Fraser, supra note 66.
77. Id.
78. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 12, at 7.
79. Criminal Injustice: Correcting a Corrections Department, supra note 64.
80. Id.
81. Memo on H.B. 1092, supra note 68.
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world.8 2 Six out of ten adults in jails have not yet been convicted of
a crime, despite our criminal justice system's presumption of inno-
cence.83 As a result, our jails and prisons are overpopulated. Penn-
sylvania is among the top ten states for the most overcrowded jails,
housing 50,000 individuals despite having a capacity for only
47,000.84 The majority of individuals in Pennsylvania's county jails
are merely awaiting trial, having not yet been convicted of a crime.
8 5
In fact, only twenty percent of Allegheny County's jail population is
actually serving a sentence.86 In Philadelphia County, sixty-five
percent of inmates are pre-trial.8 7 Housing defendants before trial
is expensive for taxpayers. For example, housing a single inmate
for one day in Allegheny County jail costs taxpayers $86.77.88 Hous-
ing a pre-trial defendant in Philadelphia costs taxpayers $120 a
day.8 9 As a result, incarcerating individuals yet to be convicted of a
crime perpetuates the country's reliance on incarceration.
v. Monetary Bail Increases the Number of Guilty Pleas
Defendants who are incarcerated before trial are more likely to
be convicted than those released before trial.90 Defendants held in
jail longer than three days are thirty percent more likely to be con-
victed or plead guilty, three times more likely to be sentenced to
prison, and twice as likely to be sentenced for a longer period of in-
carceration.91 After spending time in jail, defendants are more
likely to take a plea deal than spend more time in jail awaiting
trial.92 This is especially true if defendants have already served a
sentence that is long enough to satisfy the plea's requirements
while awaiting trial, known as the time-served plea.93 New Jersey
Assistant Attorney General Elie Honig has suggested that the time-
served plea is a common practice amongst prosecutors.94 After a
few months in jail, prosecutors might offer defendants awaiting
trial a plea deal.95 The defendants in these time-served plea deals
82. Fraser, supra note 66.
83. Wiltz, supra note 4.
84. Memo on H.B. 1092, supra note 68.
85. Fraser, supra note 66.
86. Id.
87. Memo on H.B. 1092, supra note 68.
88. Fraser, supra note 66.
89. Wiltz, supra note 4.
90. Fraser, supra note 66.
91. Id.
92. Wiltz, supra note 4.
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will have already served the requisite amount of time proposed by
the prosecutor's deal.96 If they take the plea, they can go home that
day.97 Honig acknowledged the practice as an easy way to obtain
guilty pleas.98 If the defendant takes this plea deal but did not ac-
tually commit the crime, the case is considered closed and law en-
forcement discontinues investigation.99 Yet, the individual who ac-
tually committed the crime remains free, affecting public safety and
exposing the public to potential risk of subsequent crimes by this
individual.100 Finally, if a defendant is not given a plea option and
remains incarcerated until trial, he or she may not have the oppor-
tunity to gather the information needed to support a defense at
trial. 101
vi. Overall Impact of the Practical Problems
Taken together, pre-trial detention leads to long-term practical
impacts on defendants, particularly indigent defendants who may
be otherwise eligible for pre-trial release. Those problems reveal
how the system undermines its own purpose of ensuring appear-
ance in court and impacts the criminal justice system as a whole.
The problems boil down to an over-reliance on monetary conditions
of release and represent a call to action to the legislature. The leg-
islature should respond with a restructured system that changes
focus on monetary conditions of release and instead relies on more
objective conditions of release that focus on risk of flight and com-
munity safety. The solution proposed in this article does precisely
that, and suggests eliminating monetary conditions of release-
combating these problems from the root.
B. Problems with the Bail System Identified by Courts
Courts have recognized that the bail system-particularly a mon-
etary bail system-is not without problems and certain bail
schemes may in fact raise constitutional issues. At the heart of the
bail system is the practice of pre-trial detention in and of itself-a




99. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 12, at 7.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 4.
102. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987).
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preme Court in United States v. Salerno held that there is no abso-
lute right to bail because while an individual has a strong interest
in liberty, the government's interest in preventing crime by ar-
restees is both legitimate and compelling.103 Therefore, while Sa-
lerno certainly recognizes that a bail system inherently comes with
the problem of liberty infringement, pre-trial detention alone is not
a problem that the Supreme Court has recognized as unconstitu-
tional or detrimental.
Courts, however, have invalidated the practice of setting an un-
reasonably high bail, to the point of practically denying bail to a
defendant, as a violation of the Eighth Amendment.104 In Stack v.
Boyle, the United States Supreme Court recognized two problems
with pre-trial detention: first, that freedom before conviction helps
the defendant prepare a defense, and second, that pre-trial deten-
tion could be an infliction of punishment before conviction.10 5 The
Court in Stack noted that the purpose of bail is to assure appear-
ance at trial and therefore the defendant's bail amount must be
fixed individually.106 Similarly, in Carlson v. Landon, the United
States Supreme Court found that the use of discretion in imposing
pre-trial detention is not founded on any one fact or set of facts;
rather, it is proper to consider all of the attending circumstances.10 7
Moreover, courts have found that high bail amounts pose partic-
ular problems for indigent defendants. In Jones v. City of Clanton,
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama
held that pre-trial detention due to the defendant's inability to pay
for release violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.108 There, the city used a generic bail schedule to de-
termine the defendant's bond amount and there was no option for
release through recognizance or an unsecured bond.10 9 The court
found that bail schedules without any individualized hearing re-
garding the person's indigence and need for bail alternatives are
unconstitutional and violate the Due Process Clause.110 The court
noted that bail schedules imposing unnecessary pre-trial detention
103. Id. at 748-49.
104. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
105. Id. at 4.
106. Id. at 5.
107. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 532-33 (1951).
108. Jones v. City of Clanton, NO. 2:15cv34-MHT, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121879, at *7
(M.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2015).
109. Id. at *3.
110. Id. at *7.
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can detrimentally impact individuals, resulting in loss of a job, fam-
ily life disruption, and idleness.1 Such pre-trial detention also im-
pedes preparation of an individual's defense, induces guilty pleas,
burdens taxpayers, and possibly results in pre-trial detention that
exceeds the expected sentence.112 Similarly, in State v. Blake, the
Supreme Court of Alabama held that a bail system based solely on
some form of monetary bail without options for release on recogni-
zance in appropriate circumstances is unconstitutional.
113
Read together, these cases have addressed the problems associ-
ated with a bail system. Specifically, in the realm of constitution-
ality, courts have recognized that an individual's liberty is certainly
infringed with bail practices, and understanding the impact that a
particular bail practice has on an individual's liberty interest is im-
portant in determining constitutionality. Courts have also ad-
dressed the importance of having alternatives to monetary bail and
the vulnerability of indigent defendants with a monetary bail sys-
tem. Courts have noted the detrimental impact that deprivation of
liberty can have on defendants, particularly when it is appropriate
to offer defendants alternatives to monetary bail. Finally, courts
have underscored the problem of using bail as a punitive tactic ra-
ther than an assurance for appearance.
In determining the constitutionality of bail practices, the judici-
ary has outlined the problems associated with current bail systems.
State legislatures should respond in kind to address these prob-
lems. Importantly, despite the abundance of case law that signals
the unconstitutionality of setting high bail to prevent defendants
from being released pre-trial, this practice has increased with cur-
rent monetary bail systems.114 Therefore, a gap still exists between
the problems outlined by the courts and the legislature's response
to these problems. After reviewing how other jurisdictions and
Pennsylvania have responded, this article proposes a solution for
Pennsylvania that combats the problems courts have identified
with a monetary bail system, particularly for indigent defendants.
C. Literature and Commentary Related to a Monetary Bail Sys-
tem
Existing literature related to monetary bail systems outlines ev-
eral problems associated with the system and proposes solutions to
111. Id. at *8.
112. Id. at *8-9.
113. State v. Blake, 642 So. 2d 959, 968 (Ala. 1994).
114. Goff, supra note 13, at 889.
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address these problems. Authors, however, differ in their proposed
solutions.
Kyle Rohrer's Bail Reform Act discussed the states' failure to
eliminate surety and cash bonds from their bail systems.115 Rohrer
specifically identified the problems with cash bail systems: jail over-
crowding, the disproportionate detention of indigent defendants
pre-trial, and defendants' inability to assist in defense preparation
when detained pre-trial, leading to more wrongful convictions.
116
He noted that the federal system utilizes pre-trial services that en-
courage non-financial release conditions over monetary bail condi-
tions, while states still primarily use cash bail systems to determine
whether a defendant will be detained pre-trial.117 Rohrer argued
that states move away from a cash bail system through pre-trial
services systems that employ risk-assessment tools to promote de-
fendants' pre-trial release.
118
A Symposium Note on the Wasteful Enterprise of America's Bail
System similarly suggested that a wealth-based bail system inhibits
a defendant's ability to assist in their defense, and also increases
the likelihood of a guilty plea.119 It explained that monetary bail
systems have a disproportionate effect on the indigent; an illusory
impact on justice; a negative impact on the defendant's family, ed-
ucation, housing, employment, connection to the community, and
access to governmental services; an increase to guilty pleas; an in-
crease to recidivism; and a negative impact on a defendant's ability
to establish a defense.120 Precisely because pre-trial incarceration
is expensive to taxpayers and hurts a defendant's long term produc-
tivity, community well being, and family unity,121 the Note called
for policy reform.122 It discussed the implementation of risk-assess-
ment tools in New York City and Washington, D.C., encouraging
pre-trial release pending trial and combating the problems associ-
ated with wealth-based pre-trial detention systems.123 Unlike Roh-
rer's article, however, this Note argued that determining bail deci-
sions based on criteria such as socioeconomic background, neigh-
115. Kyle Rohrer, Comment, Why Has the Bail Reform Act Not Been Adopted by the State
Systems?, 95 OR. L. REV. 517, 519 (2017).
116. Id. at 521-22.
117. Id. at 524-25.
118. Id. at 538.
119. Goff, supra note 13, at 881-82.
120. Id. at 896-901.
121. Id. at 882.
122. Id. at 887-88.
123. Id. at 893-95.
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borhood, or education level only perpetuate the monetary bail sys-
tem injustices.124 The Note called for state legislatures to reform
bail policies that permit pre-trial detention only when "no reasona-
ble set of conditions can allay concerns of failure-to-appear or com-
munity safety"125 and that any bail decision should not be deter-
mined solely through assessing an individual's risk to public safety
or flight risk.
126
In sum, existing literature surrounding a monetary bail system
notes similar problems associated with a monetary bail system out-
lined previously in Part A and Part B of this section. As this article
will also suggest, the existing literature calls for reform by the leg-
islatures. The difference in opinion surrounding the appropriate
solution reveals that there may be several appropriate reforms to
the bail system. Additionally, perhaps jurisdictions must weigh the
benefits and drawbacks of reform tactics-small steps versus
sweeping reform. This article proposes a solution that adopts Roh-
rer's proposition that risk-assessment tools are appropriate ways to
determine pre-trial detention, while not contravening the Note's as-
sertion that risk-assessment tools can perpetuate the injustices of
a monetary bail system. The proposed solution relies on a risk-as-
sessment ool that uses objective factors that assess a defendant's
risk of flight and threat to the community-not criteria like educa-
tion or socioeconomic status. In fact, the proposed solution for
Pennsylvania goes beyond only using pre-trial risk-assessment
tools in making bail decisions-it calls for completely eliminating
the use of cash as a method of release. Importantly, this literature
review reveals that in order to find the appropriate solution, juris-
dictions must rely on the data of the current system in creating re-
form. 127 The data, along with the current literature outlined in this
section, can serve as a foundation for reform to Pennsylvania's bail
system.
D. Empirical Studies that Reveal Problems of a Monetary Bail
System
Empirical studies reveal the arbitrariness of a monetary bail sys-
tem because magisterial district judges, as decision makers, can
124. Id. at 887.
125. Id. at 888.
126. Id. at 911.
127. For example, recall that in 2014 Allegheny County judges predominately imposed
monetary bail conditions. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. Furthermore, empirical
data regarding Pennsylvania's current monetary bail system that can assist in finding the
appropriate solution are outlined in part D of this section.
Summer 2019
Duquesne Law Review
bring biases into their bail decisions.128 That is not to say that all
bail decisions are grossly unfounded; however, it does create a sys-
tem where a bit of luck comes into play. Outcomes, of course, de-
pend on which judge is assigned the case. The 2016 Heavy Costs of
High Bail study of monetary bail implications in Philadelphia and
Pittsburgh showed that "[a]ll else being equal, some judges assess
money bail frequently, while others do so sparingly."129 Further-
more, the imposition of money bail has a causal impact on guilty
pleas and recidivism.130 The study labeled the judges who fre-
quently imposed money bail conditions as "severe," and found that
defendants who were assigned one of these more "severe" judges
were more likely to be assigned money bail for reasons other than
the defendant's personal characteristics or the underlying facts of
the case.131 Similarly-situated defendants may receive different
bail assessments based on the "severity" of their assigned judge.
132
In these two jurisdictions, judge assignment is essentially ran-
dom.133 Philadelphia has a 24-hour bail court in a centralized loca-
tion where judges rotate through hearing cases.13 4 Pittsburgh
judges preside over bail hearings for the arrests that occur within
that magisterial district judge's jurisdiction, but some defendants
may be assigned another magisterial district judge on nights or
weekends.135 Therefore, the decision of whether to impose a mone-
tary bail condition-the decision that has the power to predict the
outcome of the defendant's entire case-is based on essentially ran-
dom magistrate assignment and granted extreme judicial discre-
tion.136 Indeed, release before trial is the single most important de-
cision made in the criminal justice system, because this first deci-
sion impacts each decision that follows, including length of incar-
ceration and likelihood of recidivism.13 7 The criminal justice system
is not perfect, having been "[c]reated by human beings . . . [and] at
the mercy of human error, usually made in good faith, although oc-
casionally with ill intent."1 8 What we can expect, however, is that
128. Criminal Injustice: Correcting a Corrections Department, supra note 64.
129. Gupta et al., supra note 58, at 472.
130. Id. at 487, 495.
131. Id. at 472.
132. Id. at 481.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 477.
135. Id. at 478.
136. Id. at 472.
137. Press Release, Laura & John Arnold Found., More than 20 Cities and States Adopt
Risk Assessment Tool to Help Judges Decide Which Defendants to Detain Prior to Trial (June
26, 2015), https://www.courts.wa.gov/subsite/mjc/docs/ArnoldFoundation.pdf.
138. Greg Johnson, A More Perfect Criminal Justice System, PENN TODAY (Dec. 18, 2014),
https://penntoday.upenn.edu/2014-12-18/features/more-perfect-criminal-justice-system.
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the front-end decisions be based on objective criteria, rather than
subjectivity.
Overall, the empirical data reveal that current monetary bail
practices in Pennsylvania are causing the practical problems and
negative impacts outlined throughout this section. The legislature
must respond with appropriate reforms in order to address these
problems. This article ultimately proposes a solution for Pennsyl-
vania that will combat the problems and reduce the arbitrary im-
position of bail by completely eliminating the use of cash as a
method of release. This solution eliminates a defendant's economic
status as a factor determining release, and instead proposes using
risk-assessment tools to aid in pre-trial detention decisions.
V. How OTHER JURISDICTIONS HAVE ADDRESSED THE
PROBLEMS WITH A MONETARY BAIL SYSTEM
"Solving this problem is really the lowest hanging fruit on the
criminal justice tree. The solution is to move from an offense-
based, money-based ecision-making system to one that is risk-
based. We know what to do. We know that it works. We know
that we see immediate results."
-Cherise Fanno Burdeen, Pretrial Justice Institute CEO
139
Fortunately, society has recognized the need to move away from
a monetary bail system. Many jurisdictions have already taken ac-
tion by way of reform to address the problems associated with a
monetary bail system. This section explores some of those jurisdic-
tions. These changes can serve as a model for reforming Pennsyl-
vania's monetary bail system.
A. The Federal Bail System
In 1984, Congress passed the federal Bail Reform Act.140 In the
federal system, there is no right to bail-arrestees may be detained
pre-trial if there is a finding that "no condition or combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as
required and the safety of any other person and the community."141
The prosecutor bears the burden of showing, through a specific mo-
tion and evidence at a hearing, that a defendant should be detained
139. Fraser, supra note 66.
140. Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (1984).
141. Id. § 3142(e)(1).
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pre-trial.142 Generally, in ordering pre-trial detention, there is a
presumption of release;143 however, with some specific crimes, there
is a rebuttable presumption that no condition or combination of con-
ditions will assure appearance as required for the safety of the com-
munity.144 In United States v. Salerno,145 the United States Su-
preme Court held that detaining a defendant without bail does not
violate the Eighth Amendment because there is no absolute right to
bail.146 However, under the federal system, if a judge orders that a
person be released upon a condition or conditions pending trial, the
judge must choose the least restrictive combination of conditions to
assure appearance and community safety.147  Furthermore, if a
monetary condition is imposed, it can only be by means of an unse-
cured bond-that is, the defendant or the defendant's surety agrees
only to forfeit money or property for failing to appear and is not
required to pay any money for his release.148 The federal bail sys-
tem has struck a balance between the presumption of release and
the presumption of detention, while focusing on appearance and
safety, rather than money, in its release decisions.
B. Washington, D.C.
Washington, D.C. was the first jurisdiction to eliminate a mone-
tary bail system.149 Within the jurisdiction, eighty-eight percent of
defendants are released based on non-financial conditions.150 The
city has a pre-trial services program that determines the "risk" of a
defendant based on their criminal history, potential risk of flight,
risk to community safety, and if the defendant has substance abuse
or mental health needs.151 Low-risk defendants are released, usu-
ally without monetary conditions.152 Examples of non-monetary
142. Id. § 3142(f).
143. See id. § 3142(b).
144. Id. § 3142(e)(3) (setting forth circumstances in which there shall be a rebuttable pre-
sumption that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure safety and
appearance which include: an offense under the Controlled Substance Act for which the max-
imum term of imprisonment is ten years; the use of a firearm during a crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime; conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure persons or damage property
in a foreign country; acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries; federal crimes of
terrorism; peonage; and some crimes involving a minor).
145. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
146. Id. at 753.
147. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B).
148. Id. § 3142(b), (c)(1)(B)(xi)-(xii).
149. Criminal Injustice: How Bail Traps the Poor, WESA (Aug. 23, 2016) (downloaded
using iTunes).
150. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 12, at 15.
151. Wiltz, supra note 4.
152. Id.
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conditions include in-person or over-the-phone reporting to pre-trial
agencies, electronic monitoring, or drug testing.153 Ninety percent
of the defendants released without monetary bail return to court
and remain arrest-free as they await trial.
154
While Washington, D.C.'s system is known as a "model" bail sys-
tem,155 the uniqueness of the Washington, D.C. jurisdiction cannot
go without mention.156 Such uniqueness may be a contributing fac-
tor to the program's success: the federal government funds the pre-
trial services agency, the District's Public Defender Office is high-
functioning and can handle representing indigent defendants at
pre-trial detention hearings, and courts operate out of a single
courthouse.157 Of course, these services are also expensive-the
agency's budget was $62.4 million in 2016.158 Nonetheless, these
positive outcomes cannot be attributed solely to its uniqueness; em-
ploying similar methods in other jurisdictions can yield similarly
positive outcomes, even if the positive outcomes are not as powerful
as in Washington, D.C.
C. New Jersey
New Jersey has taken the most extreme stance on reforming and
eliminating its monetary bail system.159 Like other jurisdictions,
New Jersey observed that the monetary bail system was failing its
criminal defendants. Forty percent of New Jersey inmates were in-
carcerated solely because they could not afford bail, and were wait-
ing an average of 314 days for trial.160 Twelve percent of those in
jail awaiting trial could not afford their bail bonds of less than two
thousand dollars.16 1
The road to New Jersey's bail reform began with Chief Justice of
the New Jersey Supreme Court Stuart Rabner calling for efforts to
fix the bail system.16 2 As in Pennsylvania,16 3 the New Jersey Con-




156. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 12, at 15.
157. Id.
158. Wiltz, supra note 4.
159. Morning Edition: New Jersey Banking on Shift from Bail Money to Risk Assessment,
NPR (Dec. 27, 2016) (downloaded using iTunes).
160. Planet Money, supra note 1.
161. Morning Edition, supra note 159.
162. Planet Money, supra note 1.
163. PA. CONST. art. I, § 14.
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persons to be "bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital of-
fenses.' 16 4 In other words, defendants were entitled to bail-there
were no conditions in which a defendant could be detained pre-trial
without option for release.
16 5
On November 4, 2014, however, by a vote of sixty-two percent to
thirty-eight percent, New Jersey citizens voted by referendum to
amend the constitution through the New Jersey Pre-trial Detention
Amendment.16 6  Interestingly, the proposed amendment was
phrased on the ballot to be relatively tough-on-crime, despite the
fact that the non-monetary bail system would not generally be per-
ceived as a tough-on-crime initiative. For example, a portion of the
ballot read that "[t]he change to the Constitution would mean that
a court could order that a person remain in jail prior to trial, even
without a chance for the person to post bail, in some situations."
16 7
It listed examples of when a court may decide that a defendant
should be detained before trial: concerns that a defendant would not
appear in court; concerns that the defendant is a threat to safety of
another person or the community; or concerns the defendant might
obstruct the criminal justice process.16 8 Notably, these changes are
analogous to the practices in the federal system, where a defendant
may be detained before trial and denied bail altogether.
16 9
Specifically, the amendment authorized the New Jersey legisla-
ture to draft legislation regarding pre-trial release and detention
and delayed the amendment's effective date to January 1, 2017, to
allow the legislature to establish such laws.170 This opened the door
to the adoption of the New Jersey Bail Reform and Speedy Trial
Act. 171 The legislation completely eliminated bail for non-violent
defendants and put initiatives in place to monitor defendants who
164. N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 11 (amended 2014).
165. Planet Money, supra note 1.
166. Official General Election Results: Public Question NO. 1, N.J. DEP'T ST. (Dec. 2, 2014),
https://nj.gov/state/elections/2014-results/2014-official-general-public-question-1.pdf.
167. S. Con. Res. 128, 216th Leg. (N.J. 2014). The amendment removed the language
"bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or pre-
sumption great" and added the language "[p]retrial release may be denied to a person if the
court finds that no amount of monetary bail, non-monetary conditions of pretrial release, or
combination of monetary bail and non-monetary conditions would reasonably assure the per-
son's appearance in court when required, or protect the safety of any other person or the
community, or prevent the person from obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal
justice process." Id.
168. Id.
169. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1) (2018).
170. S. Con. Res. 128, 216th Leg. (N.J. 2014).
171. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 (2017).
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had been released.172 The purpose of the legislation was to "primar-
ily [rely] upon pretrial release by non-monetary means" while pro-
tecting community safety, assuring appearance in court, and pre-
venting the defendant from obstructing justice.173 The legislation
and the constitutional amendment therefore have similar purposes.
While there is a presumption of release, a prosecutor may move to
order pre-trial detention, and such detention is authorized when,
by clear and convincing evidence, no condition or combination of
conditions can effectuate the purpose of the statute.174 Interest-
ingly, the statute does contain a provision that allows monetary bail
to be set only when no condition of release will reasonably assure
appearance in court.
175
Similar to the pre-trial services programs enjoyed by Washing-
ton, D.C. defendants,176 New Jersey adopted the Public Safety As-
sessment ("PSA"), developed by the Laura and John Arnold Foun-
dation, to determine whether defendants should be released or de-
tained before trial.177 Rather than imposing arbitrary bail amounts,
the PSA's goal is to help judges make decisions regarding a defend-
ant's pre-trial detention based on evidence of a defendant's poten-
tial risk.178 The assessment, based on 1.5 million cases from 300
U.S. jurisdictions, gives each defendant a score from one to six that
represents the likelihood that a particular defendant will commit a
new crime while released awaiting trial or will fail to appear for a
future court appearance.179 The lower the score, the more compel-
ling it is that a defendant should be released pending trial.180 The
PSA uses nine factors to produce its score:
* Whether the current offense is a violent one;
* Whether the defendant has a pending charge at the time
of the offense;
* Whether the defendant has a prior misdemeanor convic-
tion;
* Whether the defendant has a prior felony conviction;
172. PBS News Hour: New Jersey Eliminates Most Cash Bail, Leads Nation in Reforms,
WQED (July 22, 2017, 3:26 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/new-jersey-eliminates-
cash-bail-leads-nation-reforms.
173. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15.
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
177. Press Release, supra note 137; see also LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., PUBLIC
SAFETY ASSESSMENT: RISK FACTORS AND FORMULA 1 (2016), https://craftme-
diabucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/PDFs/PSA-Risk-Factors-and-Formula.pdf.
178. Press Release, supra note 137.
179. LAURA& JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 177, at 2-3.
180. PBS News Hour, supra note 172.
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* Whether the defendant has a prior conviction for a violent
crime;
* Whether the defendant failed to appear pre-trial within
the past two years, and, if so, how many times;
* Whether the defendant failed to appear pre-trial before
the past two years;
* Whether the defendant was previously sentenced to incar-
ceration; and
* The defendant's age at the time of arrest.18
1
Notably, the PSA does not consider discriminatory factors such
as race, ethnicity, or geography.18 2 Additionally, as a safeguard, the
PSA does not replace a judge's discretion in determining whether a
defendant should be detained or released pending trial.183 For ex-
ample, a defendant may have a high PSA score but a judge may
take into consideration that the defendant is working or supporting
children to justify release.
18 4
Since the implementation of the New Jersey Bail Reform and
Speedy Trial Act, New Jersey has monitored released defendants
pre-trial through routine check-ins to pre-trial services and elec-
tronic monitoring.18 5 Defendants now get call, text, or email re-
minders about their court dates.186 As a result, New Jersey has
seen a nineteen-percent decrease in its jail population.18 7 This
sweeping reform has likewise altered the rhetoric used in the New
Jersey criminal courts. Formerly known as a "bail hearing," the
hearing that determines whether a defendant should be detained
pre-trial is now known as a "detention hearing.188
The new system is not immune to problems, however. In May
2017, the state needed to change its PSA algorithm to recommend
detention automatically for defendants who re-offended while on re-
lease.18 9 Some police officers opposed the reform, citing anecdotal
evidence that they are re-arresting defendants only days from the
defendants' release from a prior arrest.190 Not surprisingly, the bail
bond industry has suffered as a result of the new reforms and the
largest bail bond company in New Jersey is now out of business.191
181. LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 177, at 2.
182. See id.
183. Id.







191. All Things Considered, supra note 75.
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As a leader in radical bail reform, New Jersey has certainly needed
to work through some roadblocks; nonetheless, jurisdictions that
follow in the footsteps of New Jersey can learn from any obstacles
that New Jersey has overcome and address them proactively.
D. Lessons Learned
Monetary bail is losing favor, and jurisdictions have responded
accordingly. Taken together, jurisdictions' responses favor pre-trial
release. In these jurisdictions, bail decisions focus on community
safety and ensuring appearance. Furthermore, jurisdictions have
successfully transitioned to bail systems that essentially eliminate
monetary bail conditions. Using the actions of these jurisdictions
as a foundation, along with empirical data from Pennsylvania that
reveal the arbitrariness of bail decisions, this article proposes an
objective bail system in Pennsylvania that focuses on keeping com-
munities safe, assuring defendants' appearances, and protecting in-
digent defendants from the arbitrariness of monetary bail condi-
tions.
VI. PENNSYLVANIA HAS TAKEN STEPS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
Pennsylvania has taken steps to respond to the problems associ-
ated with a monetary bail system in two ways. First, as of 2015,
thirty-seven of the sixty-seven counties throughout Pennsylvania
have implemented pre-trial services programs, and twelve of those
counties use a risk-assessment tool.192 Allegheny County, for exam-
ple, has adopted the Arnold Foundation's PSA-the same PSA im-
plemented throughout New Jersey.193 Second, Pennsylvania's Gen-
eral Assembly sought House Bill 1092, currently pending, seeks to
implement these pre-trial services and risk assessment tools into
counties throughout the Commonwealth with House Bill 1092.194
First, Allegheny County's pre-trial services program reflects the
Commonwealth's recognition that the current bail system is arbi-
trary and unjust. Allegheny County acknowledges that bail
amounts were arbitrary before 2007.195 As a precaution, bail
amounts were typically set subjectively high.196 After criticisms of
192. CARL REYNOLDS ET AL., COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS JUSTICE CTR., JUSTICE
REINVESTMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA 21 (2016).
193. Press Release, supra note 137.
194. H.B. 1092, 201st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017).
195. BRUCE BARRON, ALLEGHENY CTY. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., PRETRIAL DECISION
MAKING: HOW A MODEL PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAM CHANGED ALLEGHENY COUNTY'S




Allegheny County's previous pre-trial practices, Allegheny County
Pre-trial Services was created in 2007.197 Part of Allegheny
County's Pre-trial Services is a Bail Investigation Unit, designed to
combat high bail amounts and "get it right the first time."19 8 The
Bail Investigation Unit, located in the Allegheny County jail, inter-
views defendants face to face, verifies the information provided by
the defendant, and identifies the defendants who are eligible for
bail.199 The Bail Investigation Unit then makes pre-trial detention
recommendations based on the defendant's risk level using the Ar-
nold Foundation's PSA.200 The PSA helps provide judges with any
background information necessary to determine appropriate bail
amounts .201
The program also has an alternative to establishing a monetary
bail amount. Defendants can be granted release with conditions:
in-person and over the phone reporting requirements; electronic
monitoring; continued residence at a particular address; or avoiding
contact with an alleged victim. 20 2 Pre-trial services staff monitors
defendants' fulfillment of their conditions upon release.20 3 Since the
implementation of its pre-trial services programing, Allegheny
County's recidivism rate is down and court appearances are up.
204
As of November 2016, eighty percent of defendants appeared at all
of their hearings, seventy-nine percent of pre-trial defendants were
not re-arrested while awaiting trial, and sixty-five percent of de-
fendants were not charged with a new offense.
20 5
Second, because Pennsylvania introduced legislation to imple-
ment pre-trial services and risk-assessment tools throughout the
Commonwealth,206  the Pennsylvania General Assembly has
acknowledged the importance of moving away from an arbitrary
bail system. Primarily sponsored by Representative Joanna E.
McClinton, the purpose of House Bill 1092 was to promote safety,
produce more effective outcomes, provide courts with fact-driven in-
formation to make bond decisions, and prevent unnecessary pre-
197. Id. at 3.
198. Id. at 4.
199. Bail Investigative Unit, FIFTH JUD. DISTRICT PA., https://www.alleghe-
nycourts.us/criminal/pretrial services/bail services/biu.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
200. BARRON, supra note 195, at 4; Press Release, supra note 137.
201. Fraser, supra note 66.
202. BARRON, supra note 195, at 4-5.
203. Id. Since 2007, approximately three thousand individuals in Allegheny County are
under pre-trial supervision during a given time. Id.
204. Id.
205. NORDENBURG & THIEMAN, supra note 47, at 4.
206. H.B. 1092, 201st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017).
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trial detention.20 7 The bill outlined the responsibilities of each
county's pre-trial services programs, which include the implemen-
tation of a risk-assessment tool, supervision of released defendants,
and reminding defendants of their court dates.208 The bill still al-
lowed judges to impose a monetary bail condition.20 9 On April 7,
2017, the bill was referred to the judiciary committee,210 but it
failed.
211
VII. PENNSYLVANIA NEEDS MORE RADICAL CHANGE
Pennsylvania has taken steps in the right direction to address
the problems associated with the monetary bail system. Its actions,
however, are simply not radical enough to combat the gross injus-
tices and arbitrariness of the current monetary bail system. Cer-
tainly, Allegheny County has seen positive results in its implemen-
tation of the pre-trial services program.212 The Pennsylvania Gen-
eral Assembly, by drafting House Bill 1092, recognized the need for
these types of programs in counties as well. But because imposing
monetary bail conditions remain an option, however, glaring prob-
lems still exist with the steps, albeit in the right direction, that
Pennsylvania has implemented so far. First, the pre-trial services
and risk-assessment tools can simply be used to perpetuate a cash
bail system. Second, results from the Heavy Costs of High Bail
study in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, two areas that were using
risk-assessment tools during that time, reveal there is still wide ju-
dicial discretion in the implementation of monetary bail condi-
tions.213 Finally, magisterial judges are still influenced by their
communities and have no obligation to follow pre-trial services' rec-
ommendations.214 Each of these problems will be addressed in turn.
First, the pre-trial services and risk-assessment tools can simply
be used to perpetuate, rather than eliminate, a cash bail system,
because monetary bail is still available as a condition of a defend-
ant's release. In Allegheny County, for example, a county that uses
207. Id. § 102.
208. Id. § 301(c).
209. Id. § 501(c)(5).
210. Bill Information-History, House Bill 1092; Regular Session 2017-2018, PA GEN.
ASSEMBLY, https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfolbill-history.cfm?syear=20 17&sind=0
&body=H&type=B&bn=1092 (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
211. 2017Legislative Outlook H.B. 1092, LEXISNEXIS, https://advance.lexis.com/ (navigate
from home page to legislative materials, bill tracking, Pennsylvania, then search 2017 HB
1092, legislative outlook will be the first result).
212. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
213. Gupta et al., supra note 58, at 472.
214. Fraser, supra note 66.
Summer 2019
Duquesne Law Review
the Arnold Foundation's PSA, judges may still impose monetary
bail as a condition of release.215 In 2014, seven years after Alle-
gheny County implemented its pre-trial services program, over half
of Allegheny County arrestees were given monetary conditions of
release, and monetary bail conditions were exercised over seventy-
nine percent of defendants charged with a felony and one-third of
defendants charged with a misdemeanor.216 Therefore, because
monetary conditions are implemented so frequently, the risk-as-
sessment ools are simply being used by judges to decide whether
to impose monetary bail conditions at all, not decreasing the fre-
quency of monetary bail impositions. The risk-assessment tool is
only solving one flaw of the monetary bail system, namely arbitrar-
iness, rather than solving the larger scope of intertwined problems.
Second, as the results of the 2016 study made clear, despite both
counties' use of an empirical risk-assessment tool, judges' imposi-
tions of bail amounts-or their decision to impose monetary bail at
all-vary considerably among similarly situated defendants.
217
These results revealed that, despite the assessment's push to stand-
ardize judicial decisions, a huge variation exists in outcomes for
similar defendants.218 The study acknowledged that the results
may have external validity outside of the precise jurisdictions ex-
amined;219 therefore, this variation in defendants' outcomes will
likely occur in other counties throughout Pennsylvania should other
counties implement pre-trial services programs. These results re-
veal that the problems associated with the monetary bail system-
even arbitrariness-will not be resolved through the use of pre-trial
services programs alone.
Finally, magisterial district judges are still influenced by their
communities and have no obligation to follow pre-trial services' rec-
ommendations. Magisterial district judges are elected officials, who
have a duty to represent the communities that elected them.220
Judges may exercise discretion in determining whether to follow
the recommendations of the pre-trial risk assessments.221 Some
judges may take community influence, and the possibility of reelec-
tion, into consideration when making pre-trial detention decisions
and setting monetary bail amounts.222 Indeed, Allegheny County
215. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 524(C)(5); Press Release, supra note 137.
216. NORDENBURG & THIEMAN, supra note 47, at 6.
217. Gupta et al., supra note 58, at 472-73.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 486.
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magistrates follow the Allegheny County Pre-trial Services' bond
recommendations only sixty-three percent of the time.223 Note,
again, that these are bond recommendations coming from Alle-
gheny County Pre-trial Services: a recommendation for a particular
cash bail amount, not a recommendation for whether or not to de-
tain a defendant pre-trial.224 The current use of pre-trial assess-
ments, while a step in the right direction, are merely perpetuating
a monetary bail system rather than eliminating it.
Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests that, if monetary bail
remains an option, magisterial judges may use the assessment as
reason to set higher bail. For example, Richard King, magisterial
district judge for the district that includes the Pittsburgh neighbor-
hoods of Mt. Oliver, Carrick, and Allentown, asserts that the risk
assessment provides more insight into defendants' situations.
225
But, he is not using the pre-trial assessment's recommendation.
226
Mirroring the war-on-drugs mentality, King does not always agree
with the assessment's recommendation for drug offenses, because
"[t]here are more heroin deaths than homicides. Why should [her-
oin dealers] not be [considered] a danger to the community?"
227
Therefore, despite taking a step in the right direction, implemen-
tation of pre-trial services programs in more counties throughout
Pennsylvania is not enough. Current data supports this assertion
because, despite the use of pre-trial services programs in some
counties, the problems associated with a monetary bail system are
still perpetuated.228 This article suggests that in order to combat
the full scope of the problems, Pennsylvania must eliminate-com-
pletely-its monetary bail system. In order to determine whether
this is an appropriate solution, the legislature could solicit data that
compares defendants' outcomes in counties where judges frequently
or rarely impose monetary bail conditions. The legislature could
also solicit a method to test defendants' outcomes when monetary
bail conditions are imposed. However, the best way to test the so-
lution for Pennsylvania's monetary bail system is to look at out-
comes in other jurisdictions. Given the positive outcomes from ju-
risdictions that no longer impose monetary bail conditions, like
Washington, D.C. and New Jersey, this article proposes a more rad-
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bail conditions. It is likely that the best way to test this solution is
to implement the reform and use New Jersey as a guide-embrac-
ing New Jersey's positive outcomes and working proactively to
avoid any of New Jersey's setbacks.
VIII. PROPOSED SOLUTION TO PENNSYLVANIA'S MONETARY BAIL
SYSTEM
Pennsylvania should amend its Constitution to eliminate the
Right to Bail provision. It should also afford courts the authority to
detain defendants without an option of bail, and contemporaneously
implement legislation that effectively eliminates monetary bail con-
ditions and introduces a risk-based approach that favors condi-
tional release of defendants.
Amending the Pennsylvania Constitution requires the Pennsyl-
vania legislature to propose an amendment to be approved by ref-
erendum in the general election.229 The constitutional amendment
for the proposed solution would require citizens to eliminate the
Right to Bail provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution that pro-
tects defendants' right to be released pre-trial. This right is af-
forded to the defendant for "sufficient sureties" unless the defend-
ant's alleged crime is a capital offense for which the maximum sen-
tence is life imprisonment or if no condition other than imprison-
ment will assure the safety to the community.230 Eliminating Penn-
sylvania's Constitution's Right to Bail provision would eliminate a
defendant's right to pre-trial release and will allow judges to detain
defendants without option for release, regardless of the underlying
crime. As in the federal system, defendants will not enjoy an abso-
lute right to bail.2 3 1 Finding that a defendant may be detained with-
out bail does not violate the Eighth Amendment because the Eighth
Amendment does not afford an absolute right to bail,23 2 so this pro-
posed amendment o the Pennsylvania Constitution would not vio-
late the United States Constitution.
While this type of constitutional amendment may seem counter-
intuitive to an article that, admittedly, has advocated for a decrease
in pre-trial detention, it is the contemporaneous legislation in con-
junction with this proposed amendment hat will allow Pennsylva-
nia to implement a bail system that is less reliant on defendants'
monetary resources and more focused on community safety. Here,
229. PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
230. PA. CONST. art. I, § 14.
231. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1) (2018).
232. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 753 (1987).
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as in New Jersey, a constitutional amendment, in conjunction with
legislation, serves as the foundation of this proposed bail reform.
2 33
The contemporaneous legislation should require magistrate dis-
trict judges to make pre-trial detention decisions-favoring re-
lease-based on a pre-trial risk assessment. Pre-trial services pro-
grams within each court,234 similar to those employed in Allegheny
County,235 should conduct each defendants' pre-trial risk assess-
ment and determine the defendant's risk to the public's safety and
risk of failure to appear in court. Practically, adopting the Arnold
Foundation's pre-trial risk assessment throughout Pennsylvania is
the most sensible solution because Allegheny County can serve as
a resource to other counties in the implementation and early stages.
Furthermore, because the Arnold Foundation's assessment is based
on objective criteria specific to each defendant's risk of flight and
risk to community safety, rather than more subjective factors,236
this type of risk-assessment tool will perpetuate a more objective
system. That is essentially the goal of this reform. The legislation
should permit judges to decide that some defendants, based on their
risk-not the underlying crime or the amount of money in the de-
fendant's pockets-will, in rare circumstances, need to be detained
pre-trial. Legislation should make it clear that the option for pre-
trial detention should only be employed in rare circumstances. It is
not the underlying crime, like in Pennsylvania's current bail stat-
ute, that triggers pre-trial detention. Instead, it is the defendant's
risk-assessment score that would warrant pre-trial detention, and
pre-trial detention is never mandatory. Using the Arnold Founda-
tion's PSA as an example, the rare circumstances that would permit
pre-trial detention should be interpreted to apply only to defend-
ants whose risk-assessment score is a six.
237
The proposed legislation will go one step further in eliminating
the use of monetary bail as a condition for release. This does not
mean that release should be unconditional. Magistrate district
judges should use their discretion creatively when imposing release
conditions. Conditions adopted in other jurisdictions, such as in-
person or over-the-phone reporting requirements,238 electronic
233. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
234. The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure allow each Court of Common Pleas to
set up pretrial services programs. PA. R. CRIM. P. 530.
235. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
237. Recall that a six represents the highest possible risk-assessment score that a defend-
ant might receive. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
238. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(vi) (2018).
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monitoring,23 9 maintaining residence at a particular address,240 cur-
fews,24 1 rehabilitative classes,242 and maintaining employment
243
are reasonable alternatives to pre-trial detention that a judge may
choose to impose under the proposed bail system. Furthermore, as
in New Jersey, the pre-trial services program that conducted the
defendant's risk assessment and monitors the defendant's release
conditions could call, text, or email defendants to ensure appear-
ance at their court dates.244 This could safeguard court resources,
like judges', clerks', and juries' time, that may be wasted when de-
fendants fail to appear.245 Unlike in New Jersey, however, Penn-
sylvania legislation should not contain a provision that still allows
monetary bail to be set.246 Only a high pre-trial risk-assessment
score under the proposed solution should warrant pre-trial deten-
tion.
In order for this legislation to be constitutional in Pennsylvania,
there can be no constitutional Right to Bail provision, because such
a provision is in direct contravention to the proposed legislation.
Therefore, because it is imperative that the constitutional amend-
ment works in conjunction with the legislation, the Pennsylvania
General Assembly should take appropriate measures to ensure a
constitutional amendment when proposing the legislation.247 Sim-
ilar to New Jersey, Pennsylvania's constitutional amendment
should specifically authorize the Pennsylvania legislature to enact
legislation regarding pre-trial detention.248 The Pennsylvania leg-
islature should also take appropriate measures to ensure that the
constitutional amendment and legislation are effective on the same
date.
A. The Proposed Bail Reform in Pennsylvania Bodes Bipartisan
Appeal
The proposed solution will set Pennsylvania apart as an exem-
plar of bail reform. The process of implementing this complete bail
overhaul is certainly not simple, but with the right strategy in place
it is achievable. Forty-five percent of individuals surveyed in a 2016
239. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
240. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(iv) (2018).
241. See id. § (B)(vii).
242. See id. § (B)(iii).
243. See id. § (B)(ii).
244. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
245. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 12, at 14.
246. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 (2017).
247. See PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
248. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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Gallup poll reported that the criminal justice system is not tough
enough on crime, with only fourteen percent reporting that it was
too tough and another thirty-five percent saying it was appropri-
ate.249 The referendum vote must appeal to the public at large in
order to pass; therefore, the language of the constitutional amend-
ment will require phrasing that takes a more tough-on-crime ap-
proach, like in New Jersey.250 This tough-on-crime language sug-
gestion is not to be perceived as a tactic to mislead the public. On
the contrary, while the proposed solution is certainly designed to
decrease the number of defendants detained pre-trial, this type of
bail reform appeals to those who value a tough-on-crime approach
as well as to those who, for a variety of reasons ranging from the
recognition of flaws in the criminal justice system to a belief in al-
ternative reforms, identify as softer on crime. Furthermore, bipar-
tisan appeal increases the likelihood that the non-monetary bail
legislation will gain enthusiastic support from both parties, increas-
ing the likelihood of passage in the General Assembly and increas-
ing the chance of judicial advocates fulfilling this legislation from
the bench.
The proposed bail reform has bipartisan appeal for three reasons.
First, appealing to conservative factions, a non-monetary bail sys-
tem supports fiscal conservatism.251 Second, appealing to liberal
factions, a non-monetary bail system takes steps toward more equal
justice for those without the resources to post a monetary bond with
respect to the discrimination that comes with the cyclical effects of
poverty. Third, appealing to both factions, a non-monetary bail sys-
tem appeals to a tough-on-crime approach, as well as a softer on
crime approach by using logic in the criminal justice system.
First, a non-monetary bail system appeals to fiscal conservatism.
At its most basic level, it costs taxpayers money to house the de-
fendant pre-trial.252 Because this decision at the front end of the
criminal justice system can increase recidivism, the current system
does not respect taxpayer dollars-an increase in recidivism costs
taxpayers more money long-term due to the costs associated with
arrest, booking, pre-trial detention, courts, and housing should the
defendant be convicted.253 Overall, the proposed solution creates a
249. Crime, GALLUP, http://news.gallup.com/poll/1603/crime.aspx (last visited Feb. 18,
2018).
250. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
251. See Criminal Injustice: Correcting a Corrections Department, supra note 64.
252. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
253. See Criminal Injustice: Correcting a Corrections Department, supra note 64.
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more fair and effective criminal justice system that starts with re-
ducing corrections costs.2 54 In fact, the use of pre-trial services pro-
grams, like the risk-assessment tool, are proven to reduce the mon-
etary and human cost of corrections.
255
Second, a non-monetary bail system takes steps toward more
equal justice for those without the resources to post a monetary
bond with respect to the discrimination that comes with the cyclical
effects of poverty. The proposed system rests on data, rather than
complete discretion, and promotes consistency in pre-trial detention
decisions. Because the proposed solution relies objectively on risk
in determining pre-trial release, defendants' chances of pre-trial re-
lease are arguably more just because the amount of money they
may have to post bond is no longer the determining factor of pre-
trial release. This helps break the cyclical effects of poverty for in-
digent defendants. Many areas in our society already discriminate
based on the amount of money an individual has, so creating a more
objective foundation to our court system is crucial.
256
Third, a non-monetary bail system appeals to both a tough-on-
crime and softer on crime approach to criminal justice. On one
hand, the proposed solution bases its decisions on a reasoned foun-
dation of safety, rather than an arbitrary foundation of money. The
current bail system's effect on public safety is illusory because indi-
viduals who can afford bail are released pre-trial, free to commit
more crimes if they would so choose.257 On the other hand, the pro-
posed solution will promote safety because without a right to bail,
high-risk defendants can be detained pre-trial regardless of the un-
derlying crime. This solution appeals to safety because it roots pre-
trial detention decisions in the objective element of risk to the pub-
lic.
Additionally, the proposal might appeal to individuals who may
identify as softer on crime because it promotes logic in our criminal
justice system. Critics of the criminal justice system and, more spe-
cifically, a monetary bail system, often cite the arbitrariness of
wealth as the determining factor in whether a defendant is detained
pre-trial.258 The proposed solution, however, is not based on the
arbitrary factor of money and rather the objective factor of the de-
254. H.B. 1092, 201st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017).
255. Memo on H.B. 1092, supra note 68.
256. Examples include access to housing, education, competitive jobs, healthcare, and nu-
tritious foods.
257. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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fendant's risk to the public. This solution combats the over-detain-
ing of defendants because a judge may be uncertain of a defendant's
risk to the public. Overall, the solution appeals to a more well-rea-
soned, practical court order.
Under the proposed solution, judges can predict risk and make
informed decisions based on objective factors. Regardless of an in-
dividual's stance on crime or political leanings, all can agree that a
pre-trial detention system rooted objectively in public safety should
be the focus of the Pennsylvania General Assembly.
B. The Benefits of the Proposed Bail Reform Outweigh the Draw-
backs
The proposed solution does not come without potential draw-
backs. First, this solution will likely destroy the bail bondsman in-
dustry.259 Second, some conditions of pre-trial release, like elec-
tronic monitoring or rehabilitation classes that impose a cost on de-
fendants, may still perpetuate the problems of a monetary bail sys-
tem in a new manner. Finally, the referendum vote risks an in-
crease in pre-trial detention if the legislature does not respond with
non-monetary bail reform legislation.
First, this solution will likely destroy the bail bondsman indus-
try, similar to what occurred in New Jersey.260 The bail bondsman
industry, however, is highly criticized. Some bail bond companies
will not help defendants post bail for low amounts.26 1 The industry
is known for its aggressive pricing practices and coerciveness to-
ward defendants.2 2 Bail bondsmen use tactics known as "bail cap-
ping," where they compensate jailed inmates in exchange for re-
cruiting new clients.263 Inmate recruiters pressure and threaten
their recruits, capitalizing on the already predatory jail environ-
ment, into contracting with a bail bondsman.26 4 In return, the bail
bondsman compensates their recruiters with phone calls and money
on their commissary, because deposits are not tracked by the jail.
26 5
Outside of the United States, the only other country in the world
259. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
260. See id.
261. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 12, at 12-13.
262. Id. at 13.
263. Sukey Lewis, Inside Santa Clara Jails, Predatory Bail Schemes Flourished for Years,






that permits a bail bondsman industry is the Philippines.266 Be-
cause of these problems, the potential economic drawbacks that
might occur from the destruction of the industry are far outweighed
by the benefits of completely eliminating the problems associated
with the industry-as well as the monetary bail system. Therefore,
this potential drawback is not incredibly compelling.
Second, some conditions of pre-trial release, like electronic moni-
toring or rehabilitation classes that impose a cost on defendants,
may still perpetuate the problems of a monetary bail system in a
new manner. The proposed solution promotes conditional release,
rather than pre-trial detention. Some release conditions, however,
could still perpetuate the problems associated with a monetary bail
system because they impose costs on defendants. If a defendant has
to pay for his or her conditions of release, it is essentially the same
as paying a bond in exchange for release. For example, in Allegheny
County, electronic monitoring as a condition of release requires that
the defendant pay for fees.26 7 Judges might also impose rehabilita-
tion classes as a condition of defendants' release, at the cost of the
defendant. Because these types of conditions impose a cost on the
released defendants, the problems associated with monetary bail
are perpetuated, despite defendants' release. Therefore, to prevent
this potential drawback the proposed legislation must include suf-
ficient safeguards. One such safeguard might be to use financial
information, collected through the pre-trial assessment program, to
ensure that any pre-trial release conditions that may cost a defend-
ant money do not exceed a certain amount of the defendants' in-
come.268 Another safeguard might be to impose no costs on defend-
ants' conditions. Therefore, because the potential safeguards that
can be drafted into the legislation can prevent the problems associ-
ated with the monetary bail system from re-manifesting in condi-
tional release measures, this potential drawback is not particularly
compelling.
Finally, the most compelling of potential drawbacks is that the
referendum vote risks an increase in pre-trial detention if the legis-
lature does not respond with non-monetary bail reform legislation.
This risk could make the current system worse by perpetuating,
and intensifying, the problems associated with the current system.
The proposed constitutional amendment, without corresponding
legislation that eliminates monetary conditions of release and
266. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 12, at 13.
267. Adult Probation Special Units, FIFTH JUD. DISTRICT PA., https://www.alleghe-
nycourts.us/criminal/adult-probation/special-units.aspx#a7 (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
268. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 12, at 10.
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maintains a presumption of release unless the risk assessment in-
dicates otherwise, opens the door to detain even more defendants
than Pennsylvania's current system. Judges could choose to detain
any or every defendant pre-trial. This risk is great because all prob-
lems currently associated with a monetary bail system would likely
be amplified should the constitutional Right to Bail provision be
eliminated without being complimented with proper legislation.
Therefore, in order to prevent this problem, the Pennsylvania leg-
islature should take appropriate measures to ensure the constitu-
tional amendment specifically authorizes the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture to draft legislation regarding pre-trial detention, and legisla-
tion should be effective on the same date as the amendment. By
using New Jersey's reform action plan and timelines as a template,
Pennsylvania can mitigate the risk that the constitutional amend-
ment might increase the likelihood that defendants are detained
pre-trial. Furthermore, the proposed legislation must have enthu-
siastic advocates in the Pennsylvania's General Assembly, as well
as from the bench, to ensure compliance and prevent amendments
that could change the legislation's purpose of decreasing pre-trial
detention. While this potential drawback may be the most risky, by
using New Jersey as a model, the risk of increasing pre-trial deten-
tion and perpetuating the problems of the current system can be
mitigated.
IX. CONCLUSION
Understanding the history and purpose of bail in our criminal
justice system and Pennsylvania's current monetary bail system
helps provide a foundation to build the reform of Pennsylvania's
bail system.
There are glaring practical problems and injustices associated
with Pennsylvania's current monetary bail system, particularly for
the accused. The bail system undermines its own purpose of ensur-
ing appearance in court. Long-term, the bail system has negative
impacts on the criminal justice system as a whole. Courts, scholars,
empirical data, and the current literature have all revealed and ad-
dressed problems associated with a bail system. Themes of this
work reveal the importance of protecting liberty and also allowing
for monetary bail alternatives, particularly for indigent defendants.
The existing literature calls for reform to current bail systems.
Other jurisdictions have implemented bail reforms that promote
pre-trial release, community safety, and ensuring appearance.
Similar to these jurisdictions, Pennsylvania has taken steps in the
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right direction with the implementation of risk-assessment tools in
some counties and the General Assembly's recognition of the im-
portance of implementing risk-assessment tools in all counties. The
data in Pennsylvania, however, show that the use of risk-assess-
ment tools alone is insufficient. Therefore, more radical change is
necessary.
This article proposes a solution to Pennsylvania's current bail
system that shifts to a non-monetary bail system. Through amend-
ing Pennsylvania's Constitution and enacting concurrent legisla-
tion, Pennsylvania can begin to combat the problems associated
with the current system. The proposed solution, rooted in logic and
justice, appeals to all constituents, regardless of political leaning or
position on crime. Finally, the benefits of the reform outweigh any
potential drawbacks.
Most importantly, the proposed solution is designed to help peo-
ple. If this solution is adopted in Pennsylvania, defendants like
Mustafa Willis 26 9 may be able to navigate the criminal justice sys-
tem in a more objective and fair manner.
269. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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